A reply brief becomes most useful when it reveals precisely where two sides are talking past each other. Nevin Shetty’s July 12, 2024 reply supporting dismissal does that by returning repeatedly to one question: what did the alleged scheme seek to deprive Fabric of? The defense argued that references to self-interest, undisclosed risk and policy noncompliance did not all answer that question in the same way.
The seven-page reply followed the June motion to dismiss and the government’s opposition. It challenged the government’s account of how the indictment satisfied the property requirement of wire fraud. Its force comes from the distinctions counsel drew, not from treating their description of the prosecution’s theory as the court’s own account.
Follow the response being answered
The reply begins by describing what counsel considered a shift in emphasis. It contrasted the indictment’s account of an investment intended to benefit HighTower with later arguments about taking or embezzling money. The defense contended that those formulations were not interchangeable. This was an objection raised in litigation, rather than a judicial finding that the government had improperly changed the charges.
Counsel then returned to the indictment’s language about the destination account and the nature of the transaction. They argued that the accusation described an investment made by the CFO rather than a taking for his own use. That distinction was meant to undermine the asserted property theory. It did not establish that calling a transfer an investment makes it immune from fraud law.
The reply also distinguished a prospect of earning a share of investment returns from obtaining the original principal. The defense argued that the indictment described Shetty’s potential benefit through HighTower’s earnings. Whether that account defeated the prosecution’s theory was disputed. Its value to a reader is that it identifies the particular benefit counsel believed the indictment alleged, instead of merging every financial interest into one category.
Ask whether information is the alleged property
Another section addressed the government’s discussion of unwanted investment risk. Counsel argued that this relied on Fabric’s ability to make informed choices about its money, the kind of right-to-control theory rejected in Ciminelli v. United States. The reply focused on the legal significance of the interest allegedly lost, not merely on whether additional information would have been useful to the company.
The government, as quoted in the reply, distinguished incomplete information from no information. Counsel rejected that distinction as a way around Ciminelli. Their point was that changing the degree of informational deprivation did not, by itself, turn information into the required property interest. This was a targeted response to a specific argument, rather than an assertion that disclosure is unimportant in business.
An accurate account must preserve the other side of that distinction. Deception or nondisclosure can be relevant to obtaining money or property even though valuable economic information is not itself the property identified by the rejected theory. The reply disputed whether the indictment sufficiently alleged that additional connection. It did not change the ordinary fact that corporate cash is property.
Understand why the board resolution appears
The reply introduced the board resolution adopting Fabric’s investment policy as part of its authority argument. Counsel relied on language empowering officers to take further actions they considered necessary or advisable to carry out the policy’s purposes. They argued that this delegation complicated the government’s portrayal of the investment as unauthorized.
That is different from a resolution expressly approving HighTower. The document adopted a policy and delegated implementation responsibilities. The defense’s claim that the delegation covered the disputed transaction was an interpretation requiring analysis of scope, purpose and the circumstances. The resolution should therefore be described as evidence supporting an authority argument, not as a named approval of the investment itself.
Counsel used alternative reasoning here too. They argued first that a policy breach did not automatically establish property deprivation, then that the indictment had not adequately alleged lack of authority, and finally that the policy and resolution supported the investment. Each argument challenged a different step. Combining them into a single claim that policy compliance had been conclusively proved would lose the reply’s actual structure.
Separate the object of a scheme from its eventual loss
Near its end, the reply addressed the government’s discussion of permanent or lasting loss. Counsel said the defense was disputing deprivation of a traditional property interest, rather than demanding proof of a permanent loss. That passage is important because it clarifies the argument the reply wanted the court to decide.
Later law reinforces the need for precision. In Kousisis v. United States, decided in May 2025, the Supreme Court held that fraudulent inducement can support liability without an intended net economic loss. The reply predates that decision. Its discussion cannot fairly be used today to suggest that an anticipated return to Fabric necessarily foreclosed a property-fraud prosecution.
The NACDL brief supporting dismissal subsequently addressed related questions about the reach of federal fraud law. It represents a further argument in support of the defense, rather than a judicial endorsement. Shetty’s public site provides access to his broader materials, while this reply supplies the narrower account of how counsel answered the government’s opposition.
The motion to dismiss was denied in December 2024. Shetty was convicted on four wire-fraud counts on November 7, 2025, and sentenced to two years in prison on March 5, 2026. Those outcomes belong alongside the argument’s history. The July reply remains worth reading because it makes the defense’s requested distinctions visible: principal and anticipated returns, information and property, delegated authority and a transaction’s label. Understanding those distinctions provides a more exact account of Shetty’s position than either an accusation alone or an unqualified claim of vindication.